Information about the future may be instrumentally useful, yet scary. For example, many patients shy away from precise genetic tests about their dispositions for severe diseases. They are afraid that a bad test result could render them desperate due to anticipatory feelings. We show that partially revealing tests are typically optimal when anticipatory utility interacts with an instrumental need for information. The same result emerges when patients rely on probability weighting. Optimal tests provide only two signals, which renders them easily implementable. While the good signal is typically precise, the bad one remains coarse. This way, patients have a substantial chance to learn that they are free of the genetic risk in question. Yet even if the test outcome is bad, they do not end in a situation of no hope.
Introduction
It is one of the most elementary principles of decision theory that agents prefer to have as much information as possible before making a decision. More information allows agents to fine-tune their decisions. For example, planning the future becomes easier when knowing the challenges that lie ahead.
The following thought experiment may illustrate why nevertheless there are contexts in which information is not necessarily desirable: Imagine there was a test that could determine whether you survive the next t years or not. Set t to a relevant value, e.g., about half the time you expect to survive from now on. Assume that for some reason you are entirely confident about the accuracy of the test. Would you want to get this information? Contrary to the reasoning in the first paragraph, this is a question many people find difficult to answer.
While most people are currently not confronted with such a fundamental testing decision, people under risk of having inherited Huntington's disease are. Huntington's disease is a severe genetic disorder which breaks out around the age of 40. As more and more cells get damaged by the disease both mental and physical health deteriorate. After some years, patients end up in dementia and disability, needing full-time care. Patients die 20 years younger than other people on average. There is no cure for Huntington's disease. Children of patients have a 50% risk of having inherited the disease (provided that exactly one parent has it). Consequently, the risk for grandchildren is 25%. Since the 1980s, a genetic test is available which allows to almost perfectly determine if a person will eventually get the disease.
People under risk often find it difficult to decide whether to take the test or not. There are books solely dedicated to this decision. 1 Many people postpone the decision, they wait for years before eventually taking the test. The problem of testing for Huntington's disease may seem like a -disturbingly severe -minority problem. Yet likely, this type of problem will become more wide-spread as research into human genetics progresses and more and more genetic dispositions become detectable. We will employ this testing decision as our running example in the following. 1 See, e.g., Baréma (2005) .
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This paper presents a simple but robust model that aims at capturing why tests that provide life-changing outcomes can be challenging. To this end, we blend risk preferences regarding anticipated outcomes with instrumental information. We study the design of optimal tests in this setup. Optimal tests often turn out to be coarse. They either provide a perfectly informative signal in the good domain, then, the genetic risk is absent. Or they provide a coarse bad signal, which means that the patient has to correct his hope to stay healthy downwards. In the latter case, there still remains justified reason to hope that the disease will not break out as the coarse signal emerges from pooling. 2 This differentiates the coarse test from the precise one. We also show that when a patient relies on prominent forms of probability weighting regarding future outcomes the results remain robust.
This type of test is easily illustrated in terms of our thought experiment from the beginning.
Imagine that with a probability of 50% you will survive the next t years. Consider a test that provides only two outcomes: If you will live for more than these t years, the test reveals this with a probability of, say, 30%. In all other cases, you receive a pooling signal which implies that you have to adjust your life expectancy slightly downwards. Thus, taking the test offers the possibility of getting good news while you never receive information that you will die within the next t years for sure. Taking such a test may feel less scary than a precise one.
The medical literature has discussed the careful use of precise tests extensively 3 but has not looked into the possibility of letting patients choose between precise and coarse tests. While new in medical testing, randomized mechanisms are well-established in a variety of other contexts.
Examples range from complex random procedures for determining start configurations in sports contests (such as in the soccer world cup) to randomized pricing in the airline industry. 4 We emphasize in this paper that the technical progress in the design of information structures allows for better test design when it comes to crucial, potentially life-changing tests as in medical 2 Thus there are no false negatives, while false positives occur. Here, we use the term positive as in "HIVpositive". 3 For example, basic fertility tests, though cheap, are recommended only to couples who have unsuccessfully tried for one year to become pregnant, see the current guidelines of the CDC or the British NHS. Recently, the PSA test (an indicator for prostate cancer) was criticized heavily for being overused on patients, see, e.g., Walter et al. (2006) . 4 See also Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) for a recent contribution regarding strategic randomization in information transmission as applicable in litigation.
3 contexts as well.
The key idea behind our model is that an agent's utility at a given point in time is influenced not only by his current situation but also by expected future prospects. This is the anticipatory utility approach put forward by Loewenstein (1987) , see below for more references. For a very simple example of anticipatory utility, people look forward to holidays in Hawaii and this may lift up their spirits even months before the journey begins. Notably, what influences their utility now is not how those holidays will actually turn out to be, but how they expect them to be.
This idea is subtly yet crucially different from the classical assumption that an agent only takes into account the (discounted) utility he enjoys at a later point in time when making a decision.
Agreeing to receive a piece of information is, so to say, equivalent to entering a gamble over anticipated utility outcomes which -by Bayesian rationality -leaves the status quo unchanged in expectation. Thus, other factors aside, an agent who is risk-averse with respect to anticipated utility will never want to receive any information about the future -while an agent who is "riskloving", i.e. eager to learn about the future, would opt for precise information. The risk aversion in our model is hence analogous to the standard concept of risk aversion with the only difference that it applies to anticipated outcomes instead of realized physical outcomes.
In addition to anticipatory utility our model incorporates costs. Agents with better information make better decisions, e.g. better suited career or family plans. Under risk aversion regarding anticipated payoffs, this leads to a trade-off. Getting more information allows to make better plans for the future, but it also increases the risk of obtaining bad information that will lower anticipatory utility.
Our model and analysis can easily be augmented to include other behavioral aspects. Anticipatory utility has been identified as a plausible factor in decisions about receiving crucial information about the future. There may be alternative or additional reasons why patients shy away from medical tests. Likewise, avoiding costs from less than optimal plans for the future need not be the only argument in favor of perfectly revelatory tests. 5 We design optimal tests when there are conflicting forces at work. As a concrete example, we adapt the analysis to a 5 Another reason could be curiosity, which, as we will see, can be covered by the analysis as well.
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setting where patients use probability weighting to evaluate the likelihood of different health outcomes. The difference between being healthy with a probability of 95% or 100% may be perceived as much greater than the difference between 50% and 60%. This is the famous "underweighting of high probabilities" pointed out by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . Even in the absence of instrumental information, probability weighting leads to the same structure of optimal tests as before. Probability weighting is thus a second, independent factor in favor of tests that either deliver clear-cut good news, or a coarse bad signals.
Section 2 introduces our basic model of medical testing in the presence of anticipatory utility and instrumental information. In Section 3, we solve the decision problem of a doctor designing an optimal test for a patient. Section 4 introduces additional assumptions under which the optimal test provides either clear-cut good news or a pooling signal that corrects beliefs about staying healthy downwards. This test structure emerges when the quality of life plans primarily hinges on the precision of information about the future, and if information aversion is more pronounced for bad outcomes than for good ones. Section 5 adapts our framework, allowing anticipatory utility to depend on behaviorally weighted probabilities. Again, the same test structures turn out to be optimal. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
Related Literature
Contributions such as Loewenstein (1987) relations. The main distinction between our work and most of these contributions is that we focus on the design of optimal tests that can be partially revelatory.
Caplin and Leahy (2004) study testing decisions under anticipatory utility yet in the absence of instrumental information. Kőszegi (2003 Kőszegi ( , 2006 blend anticipatory utility with costs of suboptimal decisions. Kőszegi (2003) focuses on patients' preferences with regard to perfectly revelatory tests. Kőszegi (2006) studies the exchange of information between doctor and patient in a cheaptalk game in which the doctor is severely limited in his power to commit on truthfulness. The patient has to choose between taking a therapy or not. For the doctor, as he cares about the patient's well-being, this creates an incentive to downplay the severeness of the patient's illness (as long as the patient still takes the therapy). 6 Yet the patient understands this, and therefore, the doctor can only credibly release rough signals about the health status of the patient. 7 In a sense complementary to this analysis, we focus on the case where commitment is possible as, e.g., in genetic testing, as hard information can be generated in this case and the doctor does not receive more information than the patient himself. See also the discussion at the end of Section 2. Finally, in an empirical study, Oster, Dorsey and Shoulson (2013) show that anticipatory utility can well explain observed decisions for and against taking the perfectly revelatory test for Huntington's disease.
To our knowledge, Caplin and Eliaz (2003) is the only other paper which considers optimal test design under anticipatory utility. The authors focus on tests for HIV. They suggest partially revelatory certificates as a way to motivate agents with anticipatory utility to get tested at all.
Caplin and Eliaz identify a testing procedure that yields an 'infection-free" equilibrium such that HIV is no longer transmitted to healthy people. The test is thus designed with a different intent, namely protecting healthy people. The well-being of an individual patient is a potential constraint that does not allow the test-designer to implement the first best solution which would be a perfectly revelatory test. Thus there is a conflict of interest between test-designer and potentially infected patients. This is different from our analysis, where doctor's and patient's interests are perfectly aligned. The goal is to identify the optimal test according to an individual patient's needs. Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) have argued that models of anticipatory utility have difficulties in capturing the following phenomenon. Patients with a high probability of being healthy are more information-seeking than patients with a low probability. However, in the settings of Sections 4 and 5, we observe this type of behavior. The optimal test is non-revealing for small priors and partially revealing for large priors. We discuss how our findings can be reconciled with their results at the end of Section 4.
There has been some debate about revealed-preference foundations for anticipatory utility Spiegler, 2006, Epstein, 2008) . Further, it may be difficult for a doctor to infer a patient's exact preferences for information. Our contribution is, in a sense, orthogonal to this discussion.
We argue that the same small family of tests emerges as optimal under a broad class of preferences. Thus, offering the patient some tests from that family can be a good idea even without knowledge of his exact preferences.
From a technical point of view, our paper is related to works on strategic conflict in information transmission: Rosar (2014) also considers test design. The characterization of optimal signals in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) crucially relies on a classical result from geometric moment theory (Kemperman, 1968) which is also the key in our derivation of optimal tests. These papers focus on problems caused by strategic interaction between economic agents. We consider problems caused by the need to control one's own expectations. In our model, there is no conflict of interest when it comes to information transmission.
The Basic Model
Consider the following game between a receiver of information ("the patient") and a revealer of information ("the doctor"). Doctor and patient share the goal of maximizing the patient's utility. They also have the same information about the patient's preferences and the ex-ante situation. There is an initially unknown state of the world X which takes the values 1 and 0 with commonly known probabilities p and 1 − p. 8 Throughout, X = 1 denotes the preferred outcome ("the patient is healthy"). X = 0 denotes the unfavorable outcome ("the patient has a severe genetic mutation and will become ill"). The timing of the game is as follows.
(i) The doctor designs a test by specifying a signal S. 9 S is a random variable correlated with X.
(ii) The patient learns the distribution of S. He decides whether he wants to take the test and observe S, or not. Both agents optimize the patient's expected realized utility given the information they have.
This realized utility is given as the sum of three terms
The term U c (X) captures the classical, "physical" utility from being healthy or ill. We assume U c as an increasing function, thus U c (X) is largest when the patient is healthy.
The term U (E[X|B]) depends on the patient's posterior expectation of X. 10 This term captures anticipatory utility. For example, a patient may feel miserable knowing that he will become ill.
Anticipating this, he may want to avoid a too revelatory test about his health condition. We assume U as increasing, continuous and concave.
The cost term C models how the patient can enhance his condition by a careful choice of life plan y. C : {0, 1} × [0, 1] → R has the property that for fixed x ∈ {0, 1}, C(x, y) is continuous in y and takes its unique minimum in C(x, x) = 0. The cost term is thus minimal when the patient knows the state of the world X and can choose the best-suited life plan y = X. If the patient does not know X, he cannot adjust his plans optimally to his (future) health condition. This leads to costs out of suboptimal planning, c(X, y). For example, the patient may want to opt for a different career plan, travel more or take more leisure time, care better about his savings, 10 A credible testing procedure will have to obey the rules of Bayesian statistics. Resulting posteriors are communicated explicitly to the patient. This rules out misperceptions of probabilities. For potential effects of probability weighting, see Section 5.
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or buy a home close to his family instead of moving far away or even abroad if he knows he is going to become ill eventually.
θ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that captures how important anticipations are compared to choosing a good life plan. We will later vary θ in order to investigate the interplay of the two terms.
We think of U c (X), U , and C as aggregates over all future time periods, i.e., discounted sums of future physical utilities, future anticipations, and future costs of having chosen a life plan y which is -ex post -suboptimal. Likewise, the choice of life plan y should be understood as an aggregate over many decisions (occupational choice, investment and saving plans, etc.). If we think of X as a genetic indicator of whether a disease will eventually break out, the patient inevitably observes X in the far future. Accordingly, the life plan y only captures decisions made before that point in time.
Two simplifications of the game are immediate. The physical utility term U c (X) is unaffected by the doctor's and the patient's decisions. It thus does not play any role in the later analysis.
Likewise, the doctor will always propose the best possible test for the patient. We can thus assume without loss of generality that the patient accepts the test in stage (ii) of the game. If the patient would refuse any (partially) revelatory test, the doctor offers an uninformative test, As we will see, the doctor may propose a test that is completely uninformative, or a test that is only partially revealing.
We assume that the doctor can offer the test the patient likes best. For instance, he may send instructions for generating the test to a medical laboratory. With regard to genetic testing, many noisy signals can be created by mixing blood samples of different patients and just testing the mixed sample for the genetic mutation of interest. 11 Assume the blood of two people at risk is mixed and then tested with a precise test: If the mixed blood sample is clean, both patients are free of the genetic mutation. If the mixed blood sample contains the mutation, either one of the patients carries the mutation, or both do. This test thus generates a noisy signal. Of course, another way to generate noisy signals is via computerized, anonymous processes.
Some authors have emphasized that preferences for information are influenced by their accessibility. 12 Indeed, a patient will likely be influenced by knowing that a sheet of paper with his diagnosis is hidden in a stack of documents right in front of him. However, it is easy to anonymize the testing procedure in a way that no such sheet of paper exists and that the doctor does not have access to X either.
Optimization
This section focuses on the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the doctor-patient game.
Proposition 1 and 2 characterize, respectively, the beliefs induced by an optimal test and the optimal test itself. Proposition 3 describes how the optimal test becomes more revelatory if the costs of making wrong decisions become more important compared to the anticipatory effects.
In order to find the equilibria, let us first consider the patient's choice of y given that B has taken the realization B = b. Ignoring terms that are independent of y, the patient's problem to choose a good life plan y is given by We now turn to the doctor's task of designing the optimal test for the patient. We take an indirect approach. First, we determine the optimal belief B * . Then we construct a test that induces this belief. have mean p. By Bayesian consistency, the doctor cannot induce any belief outside of B, as the prior needs to be preserved in expectation. 13 The set B thus encodes all possible tests, including the special cases of perfect revelation (B ∈ {0, 1}) and no revelation (B = p a.s.).
The doctor aims at maximizing the patient's expected utility, assuming the patient chooses the conditionally optimal life plan y * based on the test result:
Here, we have ignored the term E[U c (X)] since, by the law of iterated expectations, it does not affect the maximization problem. Further, we have used that E[X|B] = B and thus
. By assumption, U is concave. Moreover, Lemma 1 has shown that −c * is convex. Thus, for θ ∈ (0, 1), the function V is generally continuous but neither convex nor concave. This stems from the conflict that lies at the heart of the problem: The more standard cost-term from choosing an unsuitable life plan, E[−c * (B)], demands resolution of uncertainty.
Yet the anticipatory utility term, E[U (B)], suggests to avoid information.
U does not need to be globally concave for this conflict to arise. As soon as V is non-convex, the optimal test should not be fully revealing for some priors p. Similarly, our analysis is robust to further psychological factors such as anxiety, curiosity, fear, etc. The sole property of V that is used in the following is that it is a continuous function. 14 For instance, we could add a term γF (b) modeling curiosity to the function V . In order to capture that a more informative signal satisfies the patient's curiosity better, we could assume that F is strictly convex. This would not require any changes to our analysis (and we could conclude that for sufficiently large γ the incentives for receiving as much information as possible become dominant). Formally, a similar trade-off between concavity and convexity also lies at the heart of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)'s results on partial revelation in strategic information transmission. In their setting, one agent, the sender, can observe the state of the world. His utility depends on the decision made by another agent, the receiver, who uses the information he receives to maximize his own utility. When preferences are aligned, full revelation is optimal in their setting. In contrast, in our analysis it turns out that full revelation is often dominated by less revelatory information structures.
The optimization problem (1) is a classical problem in geometric moment theory which was solved independently by various authors in the 1950s. We refer to Kemperman (1968) for an overview of the earlier literature. To our knowledge, Richter (1957) contains the first published statement of a result which immediately implies Proposition 1 below. 15 For ease of reference, we provide a short and non-technical exposition of how to solve (1) which is given in the proof of Proposition 1.
The key observation is that the patient's utility from the optimal test is given by V (p) where V is the smallest concave function weakly greater than V . Moreover, the optimal test can be read off from the graph of V as is depicted in Figure 1 . and (d h , V (d h )) and evaluating the value of the resulting line segment at p. Since V can be characterized as the supremum over all line segments which connect two points in the graph of
is exactly what the optimal test can achieve. The proof of Proposition 1 demonstrates this point in more detail. It also shows that beliefs B which take more than two values cannot achieve more than V (p).
Then a solution B * ∈ B to (1) is given as follows:
the largest open interval with p ∈ I and
Then B * takes values b h and b l with probabilities
Existence of V is ensured since the convex hull of the graph of V exists and V is the upper contour of that convex hull. It is easy to check that B * is unique if there are no subintervals of [0, 1] on which V is linear.
To get some more intuition for the objects in the proposition, consider the case of θ = 0, i.e., the case of a patient who only cares about early resolution of uncertainty. Then V is convex and accordingly, V is given by the straight line connecting (0, V (0)) and (1, V (1)). In that case,
for all b ∈ (0, 1) and the proposition implies that B * takes values 0 and 1 with probabilities 1 − p and p. Thus the patient perfectly learns from the test whether X = 0 or X = 1. In the case where θ = 1, i.e., for a patient whose interests are dominated by anticipatory utility, V is concave and thus V ≡ V . Accordingly, we are in case (i) of the proposition and the optimal belief B * coincides with the prior p. Hence the optimal test does not reveal anything.
In the case where V and V coincide on some interval, it depends on the prior p whether the optimal test should reveal something or not. This is the result of the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Fix 0 ≤ b l < p < b h ≤ 1 and consider the random variable S with values in {"Good", "Bad"} that is generated upon observing X as follows:
"Good" with probability α "Bad" with probability 1 − α.
"Good" with probability β "Bad" with probability 1 − β,
The resulting belief B = P [X = 1|S] only takes values in {b l , b h } and E[B] = p.
Here, S = "Good" is better news than S = "Bad" since it induces the higher posterior probability b h of the good state of the world X = 1. It is straightforward to rewrite the test of Proposition 2 in a way that X only needs to be observed with some probability.
We close this section with some qualitative results on optimal tests. The first result confirms the intuition that smaller values of θ -representing a higher significance of the cost term -lead to more precise tests. under θ leads to beliefs which are closer to knowledge of X than the optimal test under θ.
14 The next result further illustrates the structure of optimal tests and states the following: Consider only tests which take two values and fix the lower of the induced beliefs d l to a value which is less informative than optimal,
implying that if a test is less informative than optimal in one direction, it is best to leave it less informative than optimal in the other direction, too.
Proposition 4. Define the prior p and the values of an optimal belief {b l , b h } as above. Assume
We have considered the case where d l is fixed and d h is variable. The argument for the opposite case is analogous.
Accuracy on Good News
Sometimes it may be difficult to observe, or communicate, the utility function V in its entirety. Moreover, even if V is completely known, constructing the optimal test remains a twodimensional optimization problem. Thus, even though the optimal test is easy in the sense that it just provides two potential results, there may still be challenges when designing it. In this section, we restrict the functions U (·) and C(·, ·) a bit more. The quality of a life plan will hinge on how far away it is from the ex post optimal one, and the patient will be specifically scared about receiving very bad news. Designing the optimal test then reduces to determining one single parameter. The optimal test structure becomes as follows: The test may perfectly reveal the good state of the world, but it never perfectly reveals the bad state. In other words, there
are no false signals of disease-freeness, while false positives occur. A patient thus either learns that he remains healthy for sure, or he receives a pooling signal. In the latter case, his belief 15 of staying healthy is corrected downwards, but not to zero. 16 In the terminology of Proposition 2, the optimal test is characterized by α ∈ (0, 1) and β = 0. Such a test structure emerges for example if V is concave on pessimistic beliefs and convex on optimistic ones as we will see in the following. 16 A similar class of tests was found optimal in Rosar (2014) in a model of strategic conflicts in information transmission. Caplin and Eliaz (2003) choose this type of test for implementing an "infection-free" equilibrium in their model of testing for AIDS. 17 Recall that U is concave and thus U being increasing means that U (b) is closer to zero for larger b. The assumption of an increasing second derivative of U , U > 0, was coined "prudence" by Kimball (1990) . It is a necessary condition for decreasing absolute risk aversion and thus satisfied by many of the standard utility functions.
With regard to the costs of an unsuited life-plan, it is only the distance to the ex-post optimal plan that matters.
The construction of V is depicted in Figure 2 . Define for z ∈ R the linear function g z : [0, 1] → R as the straight line connecting (0, z) and (1, V (1) ). Pick a value z * such that g z * is tangential to V at some point (b t , V (b t )). Set V equal to V on [0, b t ] and equal to g z * on [b t , 1]. In the picture, it is evident that this construction yields a concave function which weakly dominates V . The next proposition shows that this construction always works and that the resulting function is indeed V . 
(ii) Otherwise, there exist a unique z * ∈ R and
The boundary case (i) corresponds to the situation where the straight line connecting (0, V (0)) and (1, V (1)) dominates the graph of V for all b. In this case, full revelation is optimal at all priors. Case (ii) is depicted in Figure 2 . In that case, the function V is first concave and then linear, making the optimal test prior-dependent. Combining the preceding analysis with the result of Proposition 2, allows us to explicitly state the optimal tests: Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1, the optimal test is as follows.
(i) If p ≤ b t , the optimal test is perfectly non-revealing, e.g., α = β = 0.
(ii) If p > b t , the optimal belief B * takes only values b l = b t and b h = 1. The resulting optimal test is given by
Here, α and β are as defined in Proposition 2. Thus, for b t > 0, the optimal test sometimes reveals X = 1 but never X = 0.
The analysis in this section shows that simple binary tests with α ∈ [0, 1] and β = 0 may be promising candidates to include into menus of tests. If a doctor wishes to propose some test options to a patient -in addition to the perfectly revelatory and perfectly non-revelatory tests represented by α ∈ {0, 1} and β = 0 -it might be a good starting point to include a discretization of the range of α, e.g. the three tests corresponding to α ∈ { In the case b t > 0 of Proposition 6, we see that patients with a small prior probability of the favorable outcome 18 refuse any further information. Patients with a larger prior will instead like a partially revealing test best. 19 The demand for information thus depends on the prior. 
Biased Perceptions of Probabilities
The previous section showed that the interplay between anticipatory utility and the instrumental value of information can give rise to tests that are more accurate on good than on bad news.
This happens whenever Assumption 1 is fulfilled such that the function V is concave up to some point and convex from there on. This section demonstrates that situations where Assumption 1 holds also arise if the patient relies on probability weighting, even if there is no instrumental value of information. Probability weighting, i.e. a biased perception of probabilities, is thus a second, independent argument in favor of the structure of optimal tests identified in Proposition 6.
In the following, let us set the instrumental value of information to zero, i.e., θ = 1. Unlike before, we assume that the patient's anticipatory utility does not depend on the posterior belief B directly, but rather on a weighted version w(B) of that belief. Such probability weighting has been discussed extensively in the behavioral literature, mostly in the context of prospect theory and rank-dependent utility. 23 Following that literature, we assume that the probability weighting function w is an increasing function with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1 so that probabilities of certain events are evaluated correctly. Further, the typical form of w is an inverse S-shape:
w grows quickly near 0 and near 1. The patient thus perceives differences between intermediate probabilities, e.g. 40% and 70%, smaller than they really are. To such a patient, a coarse test 21 Epstein (2008) provides an alternative reconciliation using richer classes of preferences which may depend on the prior in more general ways than under classical, expectation-based anticipatory utility. 22 The worst possible test can be read off from the smallest convex function below V in an analogous fashion to the optimal test. As seen in Figure 2 , this smallest convex function is linear starting in (0, V (0)) until some point bw in the concavity region where it is tangential to V . The worst possible test induces beliefs b l = 0 or b h = bw for p < bw while it is non-revealing for p > bw. 23 See Wakker (2010), especially Chapter 7, for an introduction.
that involves a clear-cut signal of disease-freeness may be specifically appealing. The chance of learning to be perfectly healthy outshines the potential risk of bad, yet still coarse, news. The following analysis confirms this intuition.
The doctor's test design problem now becomes
When optimizing over potential tests, the doctor takes an unbiased expectation over the patient's long-term well-being as affected by the respective test results. 24 25 As long as the function V is continuous, this problem falls under the analysis of Section 3. incorporating an even sharper distinction between certain and uncertain prospects. While the analysis is technically a bit different, we show that again, the test structure from the previous section remains optimal. Finally, we provide some results that disentangle the influences of "overweighting of small probabilities" and "underweighting of large probabilities" on optimal tests.
Smooth Probability Weighting
In this section, we assume that the function w is three times continuously differentiable and the assumption of an inverse S-shape which is satisfied by most common smooth probability 24 A patient will likely have to live many years with a test result, such that biases in risk perception could play important roles for the utility he derives from that result. Studies document that patients tend to estimate health risk from genetic disease with less bias than risk resulting from unhealthy behavior (Weinstein, 1984) . This may be driven by an illusion of control rather that by an unrealistic optimism per se (compare McKenna, 1993 ). Yet also with regard to genetic risk, biases in perception have been documented in patients (e.g. Erblich et al., 2000) . 25 A patient may be in addition short-term biased regarding probabilities of test results. Yet such biases become irrelevant right after the test has been conducted. We therefore assume that the doctor optimizes the patient's welfare taking into account how the patient will feel about the test result in the decades to come but not how the patient may distort the probabilities of test outcomes right before the test is carried out.
weighting function such as those of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Prelec (1998) Intuitively, what needs to be ensured for the result is that the concavity of U dominates for small b while the convexity of w dominates for large b. The DARA assumption implies that U becomes increasingly less concave. The assumption on h = w −1 goes into the opposite direction. Being the inverse of w, h is S-shaped and switches at b c from convexity to concavity. The "IARA" assumption ensures that this switch is also a local property so that the function first becomes less and less convex and then more and more concave.
We next show that the probability weighting function proposed by Prelec (1998) The probability weighting function due to Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
is analytically not as tractable as Prelec's but we can easily verify visually that its curvature satisfies our assumptions for common estimates of the parameter ρ. Here, we make use of the fact that instead of monotonicity of −h (y)/h (y) we can equivalently study monotonicity of 
Neo-additive Probability Weighting
Finally, let us consider the case in which probability weighting takes the form of the neo-additive weighting function w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1 and w(b) = ρ + b(κ − ρ) for 0 < ρ < κ < 1 and b ∈ (0, 1).
The weight function is thus linear over (0, 1) but discounts probabilities which are between zero and one, treating them as if they lay between the values ρ and κ. ρ > 0 can thus be interpreted as the perceived likelihood of very unlikely yet still possible outcomes, while κ corresponds to outcomes which are almost certain but not guaranteed. Varying these parameters can give further insight into how the interplay of probability weighting and anticipatory utility works.
To warm up, let us consider the simple case where utility translates directly into weighted beliefs, i.e., V (b) = w(b). As w is no longer continuous, we cannot directly apply our previous results.
It turns out that the optimum is no longer characterized by the concave hull of V . In fact, the optimum does not even exist anymore. Yet there are ε-optimal tests. These implement the beliefs (b ε l , b h ) = (ε, 1). Thus, the patient either learns that he is healthy for certain, or ill with a high probability. 
In this setting, the smallest concave function dominating V is given by w(b) = w(b) for b > 0 and w(0) = 0. 26 Arguing as in Section 3 would thus suggest an optimal test which is perfectly
revealing. Yet such a test is now dominated by tests which are only almost perfectly revealing.
This difference emerges due to the jump of V at zero. 27 Let us now analyze the more general case where V (b) = U (w(b)) for some twice continuously differentiable, increasing, strictly concave function U . The patient thus considers variation in posterior beliefs as undesirable again. The function V jumps from U (0) to U (ρ) at zero and from U (κ) to U (1) at one. Over the interval (0, 1), V is strictly concave. As depicted in Figure   3 , two cases emerge analogously to the two cases in Proposition 5. A simple condition determines whether we are in case (i) or case (ii).
holds, we are in case (i), i.e., we have
When (3) is violated, we are in case (ii), i.e., there exists b > 0 such that V (b) > V (b) and a unique point b t ∈ (0, 1) at which the tangent to V (b) passes through (1, V (1)).
Condition (3) compares the slope of V in 0 + to the the slope of V . As seen in Figure 3 , the interior tangential point b t cannot exist when the slope of V is globally larger than the slope of V . From (3), we see that it depends on κ whether we are in case (i) or (ii). By the strict concavity of U , it follows that (3) is always satisfied for sufficiently small κ ∈ (ρ, 1), and violated for sufficiently large κ. The case distinction thus depends on how strongly high probabilities are underweighted. When underweighting is strong and κ is small, the jump of V near one dominates the information aversion induced by a concave U . We are thus in case (i) and ε-optimal tests are almost fully revelatory. When κ is sufficiently large, so that underweighting is moderate, we observe an interplay between probability weighting and anticipatory utility, leading to the optimality of partially revealing tests which have the same structure as in Proposition 6.
Proposition 10. Suppose that (3) is violated so that we are in case (ii). The tangential point
Optimal tests are characterized as in Proposition 6:
(i) If p ≤ b t , then the optimal test is perfectly non-revealing.
(ii) If p > b t , then the optimal belief takes only values b l = b t and b h = 1.
Thus, if the prior probability of being healthy is too small, the patient avoids further information.
When the prior probability is sufficiently large, the patient prefers a test which sometimes reveals perfect health but never the opposite.
We next discuss how this effect depends on ρ and κ, the overweighting of small probabilities of being healthy and the underweighting of larger ones. To this end, we study how the threshold b t reacts to small changes in ρ and κ. We interpret a decrease in b t as an increase in the utility from information: A decrease in b t implies both that the range of priors under which patients benefit from information is greater, and that the optimal test (b l , b h ) = (b t , 1) is more dispersed.
Proposition 11. Suppose that (3) is violated and denote by b t a solution to (4). We have dbt dρ < 0 and
Thus, an increase in ρ, i.e. a stronger overweighting of small probabilities, always increases the benefit of information. A decrease in κ, i.e. a stronger underweighting of large probabilities, has the same effect if the absolute risk aversion term −U /U is not too large. The effect is reversed when U is very concave, corresponding to a strong aversion against information in the absence of probability weighting.
Conclusion
Precise tests can be scary. Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that E[V (B)] ≤ V (p) for all B ∈ B and then construct B * such that it attains this upper bound. For the upper bound fix some B ∈ B and observe that since V is weakly greater than V and concave we obtain
by Jensen's inequality. Therefore, we can at most achieve V evaluated at the prior belief p.
Thus, B * = p is optimal whenever V (p) = V (p). To see that we can always achieve V (p) we Since V and V agree on the two values of B * and by the linearity of V on I, we have
and thus B * indeed attains the upper bound.
Proof of Proposition 2. Applying Bayes' rule, we immediately obtain the requirements
Solving for α and β yields the solution given in the proposition. It remains to check that 
which proves (5). The claim now follows from (5) via
Proof of Proposition 4. For fixed d l the constrained optimal test can be constructed as follows:
) with the property that g has the smallest slope among all straight lines which are weakly greater than V over [p, 1] . Clearly, 
Proof of Example 1. We have to show that the second derivative Denote the constructed function by V . In the second step we verify that V = V , i.e., that the constructed function is indeed the smallest concave function dominating V .
Step 1 : The construction of V given in the proposition is satisfied by a unique function V .
Case (i) is clear so we turn to case (ii). Note that since V is a continuous function on a compact set (and thus bounded) and since its derivative in b = 1 must be bounded from below by strict convexity near 1, we can choose real numbers z l < z h with the following properties:
By the continuity of V and our choice of Z this infimum is actually attained. Since we are in case
(ii) we also know that z * > V (0) since g z is monotonic in z. Since g z * is defined as an infimum over all g z which are greater than V and since g z is continuous in z it follows that there must exist some b t ∈ (0, 1) for which g z * (b t ) = V (b t ). Here we can exclude b t = 0 since z * > V (0). 
Step 2 : V from Step 1 is indeed the smallest concave function dominating V , V ≡ V .
Recall that the minimum of two concave functions is again concave. Thus we must have Proof of Proposition 7. We have to show that
has exactly one interior zero and is negative to its left and positive to its right. Writing V (b) = 0
we notice that the left hand side is positive and decreasing. Furthermore, the right hand side is continuous and positive from some interior point on. It remains to show that our assumptions on h(y) = w −1 (y) imply that w (b)/(w (b)) 2 is increasing and diverges to +∞ for b ↑ 1. To see this, we differentiate the identity w(h(y)) = y twice, to obtain w (h(y))h (y) = 1 and w (h(y))(h (y)) 2 + w (h(y))h (y)) = 0.
Using these two identities, we find that
which, by strict monotonicity of h, completes the argument as w /(w ) 2 and −h /h are identical up to a monotonic transformation. We thus have to show that G(z) > 0 for all z ≥ 0, i.e., over the whole range of − log(y). Defining
it follows from γλ > 1 that G(z) > g(z) so that it suffices to show g(z) ≥ 0. For z ≥ 1, we have z γ ≥ z which implies g(z) ≥ 0. For the case z ≤ 1, notice first that the function f (z) = z γ − z is convex and has its unique minimum at z * = γ We thus obtain the bound g(z) ≥ (γ − 1)(1 + f (z * )) + z · f (z * ).
Using that f (z * ) is negative, we find that this bound implies g(z) ≥ 0 whenever 
As B ε has mean p, it must take the values ε and 1 with respective probabilities After that, the remainder of the argument is analogous to the one for Proposition 6. A tangent to V at a point b t has slope V (b t ). By construction, the tangent at b t is identical to V at b = 1,
i.e.,
Plugging in V (b t ) = (κ − ρ)U (w(b t )), V (b t ) = U (w(b t )) and V (1) = U (1) and rearranging yields (4). 
